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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Julie Mead’s Article considers whether publicly funded 
voucher programs “subvert” states’ ability to provide an “adequate” 
public education consistent with state constitutional requirements.1  
                                                                                                                 
* Professor, Cornell Law School. 
 1. Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling: 
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 703 (2015). 
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The critical analytic move in Mead’s Article involves characterizing 
publicly funded voucher programs as a “discretionary option” and, in 
contrast, a state’s duty to adequately fund traditional public schools as 
a state constitutional “obligation.”2  Mead then argues that the growth 
in the number of publicly funded voucher programs and the 
accelerating participation rates in those programs threaten to dilute 
states’ abilities to meet their constitutional obligations owed to 
traditional public schools.3  Paradoxically, then, it is the interaction of 
voucher programs’ increased popularity and states’ increased 
willingness to fund them that Mead exploits to support her conclusion 
that “[s]tate constitutions have clearly established that children have a 
genuine right to a quality public education, not merely the privilege to 
shop for schooling in the educational marketplace.”4 
Just to be clear—and this central point bears repetition—Mead’s 
argument seeks to transform voucher programs’ increased popularity, 
and state governments’ increased willingness to fund them, into 
reasons to limit voucher programs rather than expand them.  Or, a 
more modest form of Mead’s thesis is that regardless of what happens 
to voucher programs, struggling traditional public schools need more, 
rather than less funding that results partly from a diminishing share of 
students served by traditional public schools. 
Perhaps even more important than Mead’s argument itself, 
however, is that the structure of her argument implies an overly 
constrained understanding of publicly funded vouchers and their 
relation to a student’s right to an adequate education.  That is, Mead’s 
argument understands publicly funded vouchers through the lens of 
only those children who attend public schools (as well as public 
schools’ numerous institutional interests and constituencies, including 
teacher unions). 
Of course, other lenses exist and publicly funded voucher programs 
are capable of far more nuanced and granular understandings than 
Mead’s Article emphasizes.  For example, one alternative way to 
understand publicly funded voucher programs is to consider how they 
provide some—perhaps many—students with their only meaningful 
access to an adequate education.  This is certainly the case for far too 
many students, many of whom are students of color or from low-
income households, or both, and assigned to “failing” or 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Id. at 728. 
 3. Id. at 737. 
 4. Id. at 743. 
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“inadequate” public schools.5  Finally, efforts to limit school choice, 
particularly in today’s No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB)6 
motivated intensive standardized test environment, imply an 
awareness of adverse selection, a core insurance law doctrine.7  And 
partly in an effort to ward off more “educational death spirals,” those 
defending public schools, such as Professor Mead, seek to limit 
alternative educational options and diminish the ability to exit failing 
(or successful) public schools.  The desired background goal—to 
dampen the increasing number of public schools lurching towards an 
“educational death spiral”—however, will continue to confront 
substantial headwinds.  Unlike, for example, the individual mandate 
provision in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),8 which is singularly 
essential to what the ACA seeks to accomplish as an insurance 
instrument, a similar “individual mandate” is simply not 
constitutionally possible in the education context. 
Thus, even if the core argument in Mead’s Article succeeded and 
public financial support for voucher programs diminished, such an 
outcome would only indirectly assist the struggling public schools 
Mead seeks to aid.9  On the one hand, it is certainly plausible that 
public schools would receive increased funding (funding otherwise 
committed to voucher programs).  On the other hand, however, while 
reducing one exit option from struggling public schools, it would not 
eliminate other exit options.10  To the extent that struggling public 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See generally RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING 
MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 25–28 (2001); James E. 
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999). 
 6. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 7. In the insurance law context, adverse selection “typically refers to the 
(theoretical) tendency for high-risk people to be more interested in insurance than 
low-risk people are.” THOMAS BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 12 (3d ed. 2013). See generally Tom Baker, 
Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, in 
RISK AND MORALITY (Richard Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003).  In the education 
context, adverse selection involves the tendency for high-achieving students to seek 
high-performing schools. 
 8. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20, 
26, and 42 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 9. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736–38. 
 10. That is, parents with the financial ability to do so may still elect for their 
children to exit public schools in favor of private schools.  Moreover, the increasing 
popularity of public charter schools provides another exit option from struggling 
public schools. See infra note 18. 
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schools need not only more funding, as Mead implies,11 but also to 
attract and retain the very types of students inclined and motivated to 
exit struggling public schools, reducing public support for voucher 
programs will only reduce, but not eliminate, avenues to exit failing 
public schools.  Moreover, reducing access to voucher programs as an 
exit option will also disproportionately harm students from low-
income households and exacerbate differences between public and 
private school profiles.12  While the Constitution permits states to 
compel education, it does not permit states to compel (or “mandate”) 
public-only education.13  Consequently, adverse selection will persist 
as a threat to public schools unable to deliver satisfactory education 
services. 
I.  WHAT TO INFER FROM INCREASINGLY POPULAR VOUCHER 
PROGRAMS? 
Professor Mead’s Article nicely inventories the surprising recent 
growth of publicly funded voucher programs as well as various 
“voucher-like” programs.14  In Table 1, Mead rightly emphasizes that 
twenty states now have some form of a publicly funded voucher 
program and “fifteen programs have been enacted since just 2013.”15  
This recent surge will not surprise families participating in voucher 
programs.  It will surprise few, if any, to learn that the survey data 
from those participating in voucher programs convey genuine 
enthusiasm.16  Of course, self-selection assuredly explains much of 
these results, as one would expect to detect enthusiasm for voucher 
programs from those who willingly chose to participate in them.  
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736. 
 12. Without access to publicly funded voucher programs, fewer children from 
low-income households will benefit from the opportunity to attend private schools.  
One consequence is that the absolute and relative percentage of low-income students 
attending private schools will drop. 
 13. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925). 
 14. See Mead, supra note 1, at 707. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See, e.g., Janet R. Beales & Maureen Wahl, Private Vouchers in Milwaukee: 
The PAVE Program, in PRIVATE VOUCHERS 57–59 (Terry M. Moe ed., 1995) 
(providing data on participating parental support of the Milwaukee program); see 
also Michael Heise et al., Private Vouchers in Indianapolis: The Golden Rule 
Program, in PRIVATE VOUCHERS, supra, at 113 (providing data on participating 
parental support of the Indianapolis program). 
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More telling, perhaps, is the more generalized increased demand for 
greater education options.17 
Notwithstanding participants’ unsurprising enthusiasm for school 
voucher programs, the spike in the growth of the publicly funded 
voucher programs that Mead describes will likely surprise many, 
particularly when assessed in light of the even more pronounced and 
sustained growth of charter schools during the past decades.18  One 
source of surprise flows from the sustained, persistent, and important 
forces that act against publicly funded voucher programs.  Public 
school teacher unions supply one predictable, vocal, and powerful 
source of opposition to publicly funded voucher programs.19  Indeed, 
the nation’s two leading teacher unions, the National Education 
Association and the American Federation of Teachers, benefit from 
“vast resources, huge memberships, pervasive political clout, and by 
almost any estimate are among the most powerful interest groups in 
all of American politics.”20  That teacher unions typically—and 
enthusiastically—oppose publicly funded voucher programs will 
surprise few.  Non-public schools pose an important threat to union 
membership and parochial union interests to the extent that these 
schools and their growth threaten to redirect public resources away 
from public schools and toward private schools. Thus, teacher union 
opposition to voucher programs is both obvious and well-understood. 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See, e.g., Dominick DiRocco, Note, Making the Grade: School Choice Comes 
to New Jersey, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 281, 283 (1997) (observing that “public 
demand for school choice is at an all time high in the United States”).  Consistent, 
stable data on general public support for voucher programs, however, are more 
elusive. See TERRY M. MOE, SCHOOLS, VOUCHERS, AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 252–
55 (2001).  More recent studies have provided additional data in this area of study. 
See, e.g., William G. Howell et al., The Public Weighs in on School Reform, EDUC. 
NEXT, Fall 2011, at 11, 16–19. 
 18. From 1999–2000 to 2011–2012, the percentage of all public schools that were 
public charter schools increased from 1.7% to 5.8%, and the total number of public 
charter schools increased from 1500 to 5700.  As well, charter schools have generally 
increased in enrollment size over time.  From 1999–2000 to 2011–2012, the number of 
students enrolled in public charter schools increased from 0.3 million to 2.1 million 
students.  During these same years, the percentage of public school students who 
attended charter schools increased from 0.7% to 4.2%.  Finally, from 2010–2011 to 
2011–2012, the number of students enrolled in public charter schools increased from 
1.8 million to 2.1 million. See Fast Facts: Charter Schools, NAT’L CENTER FOR EDUC. 
STATS., http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=30 (last visited Feb. 26, 2015). 
 19. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Krisbergh, Marginalizing Organized Educators: The 
Effect of School Choice and ‘No Child Left Behind’ On Teacher Unions, 8 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 1025, 1034–36 (2006) (describing teacher unions as among school 
voucher programs most vocal critics). 
 20. See MOE, supra note 17, at 2. 
750 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLII 
Yet other factors also fuel opposition to publicly funded voucher 
programs.  One such factor involves the public’s overall satisfaction 
with public schools.  As Professor Terry Moe notes, public opinion 
data, at least through the year 2000, tends to suggest that on average 
Americans are “fairly satisfied” with public education.21  Even if the 
American public opinion was somehow mistaken, many Americans 
are financially incented towards satisfaction with public schools.  
After all, in many suburban contexts, particularly suburbs that benefit 
from high-performing public schools, home prices reflect the 
perceived (and real) efficacy of the local public schools.22  Thus, if 
nothing else, suburban homeowners possess an important economic 
incentive that tilts them toward satisfaction with their local public 
schools and, as well, against public support for private schools that 
might compete against their public schools. 
Ambivalence or antipathy towards publicly funded voucher 
programs, whatever its source or sources, is not confined to 
abstractions and is evidenced in concrete ways.  For example, forces 
working against publicly funded school voucher programs have 
coalesced and fueled significant and persistent political losses for 
school voucher proposals placed on ballots.23  It would be easy, indeed 
too easy, to ascribe voucher programs’ ballot initiative losses to 
teacher union political opposition alone.  To be sure, teacher unions 
are among voucher programs’ most vocal and organized critics.  But 
responsibility for voucher proposals’ political losses is more 
accurately shared by a convergence of allied interests.  Among the 
less-appreciated opponents of voucher programs is suburban 
opposition, especially suburbs that benefit from well-functioning and 
desirable public schools.24 
Thus, the publicly funded voucher programs’ recent and notable 
legislative success that Mead documents25 becomes far more notable 
                                                                                                                 
 21. See MOE, supra note 17, at 70. 
 22. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School 
Choice, 111 YALE L.J. 2043, 2081 (2002); David D. Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: 
Antimarkets, Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 10 (2000) 
(noting that “[t]he reputation of the schools, in turn, adds to the value of their 
homes”); see also Thomas W. Hazlett, Selected Skirmishes: Class Warfare, REASON 
(Feb. 1, 1997), http://reason.com/archives/1997/02/01/class-warfare/print (calling this 
“the ugly financial story lurking behind the soccer-mom pandering on education”). 
 23. See Mead, supra note 1, at 705.  An interesting puzzle emerges, however, 
when one compares voucher programs’ lack of success on ballot initiatives with their 
growing legislatives successes. Id. 
 24. For an extended discussion of this point, see generally Ryan & Heise, supra 
note 22. 
 25. See Mead, supra note 1, at 708 tbl.1. 
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when this growth is nested into a general political context noted for 
indifference, at best, toward voucher programs.  The politics that 
surround voucher programs continue to shift, and they are shifting in 
directions more amenable to voucher proponents.  That is to say, 
what is notable about the voucher program growth that Mead’s 
Article documents is that it exists, notwithstanding considerable and 
sustained political hostility.26 
What can one reasonably infer from the recent growth in public 
support (and public financial support) for voucher programs that the 
Mead Article documents?  Clearly, any such growth is both relatively 
recent and, candidly, quite modest.27  As such, any inferences should 
be similarly modest.  If nothing else, recent developments imply that 
the political context surrounding the school voucher debate is 
evolving, and the velocity of change is increasing.  That the political 
impulse for publicly funded voucher programs frequently stems from 
concerns for students—and their families—otherwise trapped in 
struggling public schools remains particularly telling.28  Moreover, one 
of the NCLB’s palpable legacies, discussed more fully below, involves 
an educational climate increasingly dominated by standardized 
testing.29  While reasonable minds can, and do, differ on the 
substantive policy merits of increased standardized testing, such 
testing, combined with affirmative annual reporting requirements, has 
made the performance of schools far more transparent and accessible 
to parents.30  Making objective and salient information about school 
(and student) performance more accessible and transparent 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Mead echoes the widely acknowledged fact that “publicly funded private 
school voucher programs have not fared well when placed on ballots . . . .” Id. at 705. 
 27. For example, while the Supreme Court concluded in 2002 that publicly funded 
voucher programs did not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 639 (2002), Professor Mead identified only twenty-
four states that have enacted some form of a publicly funded voucher, or voucher-
like, program since then. See Mead, supra note 1, at 707, 708 tbl.1. 
 28. See, e.g., CLINT BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS: WAGING THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER 
SCHOOL CHOICE 15–43 (2003) (describing Polly Williams’ efforts to lead a school 
voucher campaign in Milwaukee, Wisconsin). 
 29. See, e.g., Marc Pilotin, Finding a Common Yardstick: Implementing a 
National Student Assessment and School Accountability Plan Through State-Federal 
Collaboration, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 545, 545 (2010) (noting that “[s]tandardized testing 
permeates American public education”). 
 30. Compare Diane Ravitch, Get Congress Out of the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 3, 2007, at A25 (noting that NCLB “has unleashed an unhealthy obsession with 
standardized testing”), with Thomas F. Risberg, Note, National Standards and Tests: 
The Worst Solution to America’s Educational Problems . . . Except for All the 
Others, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 890 (2011) (arguing that national standards and 
assessments is the least bad policy option). 
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contributes to increased parental demands for greater control over 
their children’s educational futures.31  An increase in parental 
demands for control over their children’s schools has fueled an 
increase in political demands for greater access to private education 
markets and schools.32  Thus, at the very least, one plausible inference 
from the growth in publicly funded voucher programs that Mead’s 
Article illustrates is that the public demand for more access to private 
schools is both increasing and becoming increasingly successful 
politically. 
II.  REFRAMING THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS AND VOUCHERS 
Professor Mead’s Article construes publicly funded vouchers as a 
threat to adequate public education, partly because of the resulting 
diversion of resources away from public and toward private schools.33  
The main threat to “regular” public schools—funding—comes into 
sharper relief when one accounts for practical fiscal realities.  
Specifically, Mead’s Article identifies the greater absolute and 
relative share of public education funds now going to voucher-
recipient schools that otherwise (presumably) would have gone to 
public schools.  This allocation jeopardizes the public schools’ ability 
to discharge their duty to provide students with “adequate” 
educational services.34  Having argued that publicly funded voucher 
programs threaten public schools’ ability to deliver a state-
constitutionally required “adequate” education, Mead goes on to 
conclude that where such a threat exists, state constitutions must 
preference public school funding over funding for voucher 
programs.35 
The central move in Mead’s Article—asserting that state 
constitutions in general, and their education clauses in particular, 
preference adequate public schools over publicly funded voucher 
programs—warrants attention for conceptual and empirical reasons.  
First, as a conceptual matter, Mead’s move implies a narrow and one-
                                                                                                                 
 31. See, e.g., Mike Johnston, From Regulation to Results: Shifting American 
Education from Inputs to Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 195, 196 (noting how 
NCLB empowered parents in part by increasing transparency of student academic 
performance). 
 32. See, e.g., Howell et al., supra note 17, at 16 fig.4, 17–19. 
 33. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 1, at 737 (noting that data “suggests that future 
challenges to [publicly funded] voucher, tax credit scholarship programs, and 
education savings account programs may take the form of school finance litigation”). 
 34. Id. at 739. 
 35. Id. 
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dimensional understanding of the relation between voucher programs 
and state constitutional guarantees for an adequate education.  By 
framing the understanding in the manner that she does, Professor 
Mead ignores the possibility that publicly funded voucher programs 
may provide some students with their only meaningful access to an 
adequate education.36  And this would be particularly true for those 
children assigned to struggling traditional public schools.37  Second, as 
an empirical matter, it does not necessarily follow that “inadequate” 
public schools will become “adequate” solely with the infusion of 
additional funds.  To some (admittedly unknown) degree, such factors 
as, for example, student peer effects, also contribute to a schools’ 
efficacy and student academic achievement outcomes independent of 
funding levels.38  And, to the extent that non-funding variables 
contribute to school adequacy, Mead’s Article does not fully account 
for them and their potential influence. 
A. Alternative Ways to Frame Publicly Funded Voucher 
Programs 
Mead’s Article frames the relation between voucher programs and 
state constitutional guarantees for adequate education in only one 
direction.  Specifically, Mead understands voucher programs as 
generating a threat to or impeding public schools’ ability to deliver a 
state constitutionally required adequate education.39  Voucher 
programs’ relation to adequate educational guarantees, however, is 
far more complex and nuanced than Mead’s Article suggests.  Indeed, 
one can just as easily and plausibly understand voucher programs as a 
policy instrument that can increase—not decrease—access to 
adequate education.  And this alternative way to understand voucher 
programs is especially apt for sub-groups of students not presently 
well-served by public schools. 
To illustrate this point, let us adopt, for example, the perspective of 
a student who, through no fault or choice of her own, finds herself 
born into a low-income household that lacks the full array of 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Indeed, to take but one example, Ohio initiated a publicly funded voucher 
program for the city of Cleveland, as the Supreme Court noted in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, to provide “educational assistance to poor children in a 
demonstrably failing public school system . . . .” 536 U.S. 639, 640 (2002). 
 37. Cf. id. (noting that Ohio enacted its voucher program to educationally assist 
poor children in demonstrably failing public school systems). 
 38. For a brief summary of the related technical literature, see Richard D. 
Kahlenberg, Learning from James Coleman, PUB. INT., Summer 2001, at 54. 
 39. See Mead, supra note 1, at 736–38. 
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educational assets typically (but by no means exclusively) found in 
middle- and upper-income households and neighborhoods.  Let us 
further assume that this low-income student resides at a specific 
address served by a local public school previously adjudicated by the 
state’s supreme court as (state) constitutionally “inadequate.”  To 
bring this thought experiment fully within the scope of the issues 
raised by the Mead Article, let us also assume that a fully accredited, 
academically thriving, private (and tuition-charging) school operates 
across the street from the student’s struggling and “inadequate” 
public school.  That our hypothetical student is legally entitled to 
discharge her state required compulsory education obligations by 
attending the private school is uncontested, as the Supreme Court in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters makes this option unambiguously clear.40  
Exercising her “Pierce option,” however, requires a degree of 
disposable income that this student’s family simply cannot afford.  
Thus, as our student cannot attend the private school absent a 
publicly funded voucher program, she finds herself legally compelled 
to attend an inadequate public school. 
Sadly, indeed, tragically, the scenario described above is not merely 
an academic thought experiment.  The “scenario” is reality for far too 
many students across the United States.  From the perspective of this 
student—and the many other students who live this reality every 
day—a publicly funded voucher program serves as an education “life 
boat” and a literal, concrete means to access a quality education.  
Given her family’s limited financial means, a publicly funded voucher 
program is functionally the only way she can exit a failing or 
inadequate public school that she is otherwise legally required to 
attend.  Thus, such voucher programs can contribute to a net increase 
in the number of students served by adequate schools.  What Mead 
characterizes as an “extra educational expenditure,”41 is certainly not 
understood as “extra” for those students who need public subsidies to 
access successful private schools.  Thus, for financially needy students, 
particularly those relegated to failing public schools, publicly funded 
voucher programs can help ensure that they receive something 
approximating equal educational opportunity. 
Even more perplexing is that Mead’s Article understands the 
threat posed by publicly funded voucher programs from the 
perspective of public schools and public school districts, noting, as did 
the Ohio Supreme Court, that publicly funded voucher programs, 
                                                                                                                 
 40. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 
510, 534–35 (1925). 
 41. Mead, supra note 1, at 736 (emphasis in original). 
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“‘should not come at the expense of our public education system or 
our public school teachers.’”42  Even if voucher programs diluted 
public education school funding, positive rights to an adequate 
education enshrined in state constitutions or education clauses attach 
to individual students—not a “public school system,”43 public school 
teachers, or administrators.  Indeed, in typical school finance (or 
“adequacy”) litigation, public schools and districts are among those 
named as defendants, not plaintiffs.  While reasonable minds can—
and frequently do44—differ on just what is meant by an “adequate” 
education, it simply cannot be understood as—or reduced to—a jobs 
protection act for the benefit of public school teacher unions. 
For the sake of argument, however, let us grant Mead’s conclusion 
that states must first “adequately” fund their public schools before 
committing public funds to voucher programs and then consider likely 
consequences.45  One immediate consequence, of course, is that our 
hypothetical student described above would lose access to a thriving 
private school and, instead, be legally obligated to attend an 
“inadequate” public school.  But what would not happen is equally 
important and instructive.  Specifically, as Mead correctly 
acknowledges, students benefitting from households that can afford 
private school tuition still retain their ability to exit failing public 
schools for more desirable private schools.46  Thus, while Mead’s 
conclusion will result in fewer people exiting public for private 
schools, it will only do so for students whose families lack the 
resources to pay for private school tuition absent a state subsidy.  
Some student cohorts, notably middle- and upper-income students, as 
well as motivated students able to secure alternative ways to finance 
private school education, will retain their ability to exit public schools.  
Paradoxically, such students may possess important human capital 
that public schools, especially struggling public schools, seek to attract 
and retain.47  Such students, however, remain outside of the reach of 
Mead’s conclusion. 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Id. at 728 (quoting Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999)). 
 43. See id. at 737, 739–40. 
 44. See, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 477, 477 (2014) (noting that debates about “equal” or “adequate” 
education have persisted for decades). 
 45. See Mead, supra note 1, at 737–38. 
 46. See id. at 743 (stating “[i]t is certainly true that parents may not be compelled 
to enroll their children in public schools”). 
 47. See generally Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, Choice, Integration, 
and Educational Opportunity: Evidence on Competitive Incentives for Student 
Sorting in Charter Schools, 12 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 351, 352–53 (2009) (noting 
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B. Money as a Partial Solution for Struggling Public Schools 
Even if the concerns expressed in Mead’s Article about the 
deleterious fiscal consequences to public schools posed by publicly 
funded voucher programs are correct, such concerns are incomplete, 
as they do not adequately reflect the rich array of non-fiscal variables 
frequently associated with desired student academic outcomes.  As a 
full review of decades of sophisticated, technical, and empirical 
literature resides beyond the scope of this Essay, what follows 
endeavors only to quickly describe the basic contours of this 
literature. 
While for many policymakers involved in education reform efforts 
the ultimate barometer of success or failure is student academic 
achievement, precisely what causes some students to perform well 
and others less well remains hotly debated and not well understood.48  
Thus far, a loose consensus lands on the importance of peer effects on 
student academic achievement and social behavior.49  While there is 
emerging agreement that good teachers, strong principals, small 
schools, small class sizes, and parental involvement can improve 
student achievement, the significance of these variables and their 
complex interactions remain contested.50  Added to these specific 
areas of debate is the more general and lingering dispute over the 
extent to which expenditures correlate with achievement—that is, 
over whether money “matters” in the school context and, if so, how 
might it matter.51 
                                                                                                                 
how the “mix” of social characteristics in a school can influence key outcomes, 
including student achievement). 
 48. For a recent discussion, see, for example, Wendy Parker, The Failings of 
Education Reform and the Promise of Integration, 90 TEX. L. REV. 395, 408–09 
(2011) (reviewing JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, 
TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN 
AMERICA (2010)). 
 49. James Coleman was the first to report this, in his famous 1966 study for the 
(now) Department of Education, which has since become known simply as “The 
Coleman Report.” JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY (1966) (studying student achievement and finding stronger correlation 
between student achievement and nonschool factors than between achievement and 
school factors).  Scores of subsequent studies have confirmed Coleman’s conclusion.  
For citations to the literature, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 25–28; Ryan, supra 
note 5, at 286–87, nn.165-66. 
 50. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2102–03; see also KAHLENBERG, supra 
note 5, at 36–37. 
 51. For research generally skeptical of a correlation between educational 
spending and educational achievement, see ERIC A. HANUSHEK ET AL., MAKING 
SCHOOLS WORK: IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AND CONTROLLING COSTS 25–48 (1994); 
ALLAN R. ODDEN & LAWRENCE O. PICUS, SCHOOL FINANCE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
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Setting aside such long-standing debates, what is reasonably clear is 
that something as complex as student academic achievement almost 
assuredly does not pivot on any single variable, such as school funding 
in general or marginal school funding diverted to private schools 
through publicly funded voucher programs in particular.52  Equally 
clear is that schools with a high concentration of students from low-
income households rarely, if ever, perform as well as their middle-
class counterparts.53  This generally holds true even when substantial 
resources are provided to these schools.54  Although several reasons 
explain why this might be so, one key point is the clear and 
undisputed one that, for an array of complex reasons, schools noted 
for concentrations of student poverty rarely realize their potential.55  
Thus, while policymakers’ focus on school funding is hardly inapt, a 
belief that funding levels alone can influence academic achievement 
ignores the rich complexity of variables that inform student academic 
achievement. 
III.  ADVERSE SELECTION AND DEATH SPIRALS: THE NCLB, 
ACA, AND SCHOOL VOUCHER OPPOSITION 
One standard critique advanced against school voucher programs, 
publicly or privately funded, is that they risk “skimming” away from 
public and towards private schools those students comparatively 
better-positioned and motivated for academic success.56  At its core, 
the “skimming” argument contains two critical components and 
                                                                                                                 
277–81 (Lane Akers ed., 1992); Eric A. Hanushek, The Impact of Differential 
Expenditures on School Performance, EDUC. RESEARCHER, May 1989, at 45, 48–50.  
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 52. See generally KAHLENBERG, supra note 5, at 36–37 (discussing factors that 
studies have shown are more closely linked to student achievement than increased 
school spending). 
 53. For a fuller account of this point, see Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2103–08. 
 54. See id. at 2106–08; see also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning, Law’s Limits, 
and Urban School Reform Challenges, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1419, 1447–53 (2007) (noting 
that a shift from school finance litigation strategy from equity to adequacy reflected, 
in part, that per pupil spending in many under-performing urban schools exceeded 
state per pupil spending means). 
 55. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, at 2103–08. 
 56. See, e.g., James Forman, Jr., Do Charter Schools Threaten Public Education?  
Emerging Evidence from Fifteen Years of a Quasi-Market for Schooling, 2007 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 839, 855 (2007) (voicing concerns over skimming effects resulting from 
school choice policies). 
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pivots on a doctrine, adverse selection, which is central to, among 
other enterprises, insurance markets.  First, public school advocates 
typically complain that voucher programs drain public schools of 
some of their highest-achieving and most motivated students (and 
their households).57  What is frequently left unstated in polite, public 
conversation, yet logically necessarily follows, is the implication that 
those students “left behind” in public schools disproportionately 
include students who are comparatively less academically competitive 
or motivated or those who are more difficult (and expensive) to 
educate.58  This is particularly bothersome to public schools now that 
public and private schools increasingly compete for students. 
A second related, though distinct, component—flowing from the 
first—is that the steady departure of a public school’s comparatively 
more motivated students may fundamentally alter a school’s internal 
dynamics in two potentially important (and damaging) ways 
consistent with what adverse selection would predict.  First, the 
departure of a school’s most able and motivated student cohort may 
prompt that school’s next most able and motivated cohort to leave as 
well.59  And so on.  Second, if so, at some point the increasing 
diminution of an absolute and relative number of able and motivated 
students itself will transform a school’s academic culture, climate, and 
political clout in less than desirable ways.60  A degradation of a 
school’s academic culture or climate might launch a school into an 
education “death spiral” and hasten a “race to the bottom.”61  Once 
ignited, education death-spirals are difficult to arrest and reverse, as 
they feed on their own self-generated destructive centripetal forces.62 
Once again, for the sake of argument, let us simply assume the 
plausibility of the threat posed by adverse selection critique 
exacerbated by publicly funded school voucher programs.  Whatever 
the adverse consequences to public schools may have been in the 
past, the implementation of NCLB dramatically increased them.  To 
help accomplish its many statutory goals, NCLB requires states to 
                                                                                                                 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 840. 
 58. See id. at 840, 851–56.  This point is also discussed by Professor Mead. See 
Mead, supra note 1, at 740–41. 
 59. See generally Forman, supra note 56. 
 60. See id. at 840. 
 61. For an early discussion of how adverse selection can trigger a “death-spiral” in 
insurance markets, see, for example, David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 
Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (1998). 
 62. See generally id; PETER W. COOKSON, JR., SCHOOL CHOICE: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 91–93 (1994); Ryan & Heise, supra note 22, 
at 2092. 
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develop and self-impose challenging academic standards,63 annually 
test students to assess progress toward state standards,64 and gather 
and disseminate relevant information to parents and others.65  A 
requirement that schools must demonstrate adequate yearly progress 
or face increasingly onerous sanctions resides at the heart of NCLB.66  
As a consequence, while a greater number of students and, ideally, a 
greater number of academically proficient students were traditionally 
deemed an asset to public school districts, the possibility of adverse 
consequences from NCLB flowing from not enough students 
demonstrating “adequate” academic progress made attracting—and 
retaining—proficient students an even higher priority for public 
school districts.67 
Insurance markets understand well the almost existential threat 
posed by adverse selection and how it can trigger “death spirals.”68  
Indeed, at the heart of the insurance market enterprise are tasks—
risk-pooling and rating—designed to blunt the ill-effects of adverse 
selection.69  Indeed, those who helped draft President Obama’s 
signature health insurance legislation, the ACA, understood this 
point better than most.  Those who crafted the ACA’s structural 
design understood well the essential need to compel, under force of 
law, participation in the health insurance pools through the individual 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. § 6301(1) (2012). 
 64. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(G). 
 65. See id. § 6311(h); see also Michael Heise, Courting Trouble: Litigation, High 
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Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2014). 
 69. See BAKER & LOGUE, supra note 7. 
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mandate to help generate the necessary heterogeneous risk pool.70  A 
heterogeneous risk pool was—and remains—a fundamental necessity 
to insure that enough premium-paying healthy participants would be 
able to cross-subsidize their less-healthy counterparts now that health 
insurance companies’ ability to define and manage risk pools was 
limited by the ACA.71  Indeed, wholly independent of one’s views of 
the constitutional integrity of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to 
uphold the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate 
provision in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,72 few—if any—observers seriously contested the empirical 
proposition that without the individual mandate the ACA would 
structurally implode.73 
While individual mandates may be able to compel participation in 
health insurance markets within the ACA context, such mandates are 
clearly not possible in the education context.  To be more precise, 
while compulsory education laws across the states are, of course, 
certainly permissible, as Pierce made clear, what Pierce also made 
crystal clear is that states may not compel public education.74  That is, 
families remain free to discharge their affirmative educational 
obligations through public or private schools.  And even if states 
could compel public-only education, states cannot mandate where 
people live, and the Court’s decision in Milliken v. Bradley illustrates 
judicial deference to school district boundaries.75  Thus, the 
interactive effect of the Pierce and Milliken decisions all but 
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 75. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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precludes the government’s ability to mandate public school 
attendance in the same manner the federal government now 
mandates participation in health insurance markets. 
Thus, while faltering public schools—similar to insurance 
markets—are exposed to adverse selection risks, and NCLB sanctions 
enhance the consequences to faltering public schools, neither public 
school administrators nor government officials possess the legal 
authority to prevent children from departing struggling public schools 
(at least those who benefit from the ability to depart struggling public 
schools for other schools).  Consequently, the adverse selection threat 
to struggling public schools is both real in theory and obvious in 
reality. 
Public school advocates, including Professor Mead, appear 
increasingly sensitive to the adverse consequences, deepened by 
NCLB, that flow from a family’s right to exit struggling schools, even 
though such flight may exacerbate a public school’s struggles.  
Lacking the constitutional ability to blunt adverse selection’s ill-
effects on public schools by mandating that families enroll their 
children in public schools, public school advocates turn to efforts to 
reduce access to the private school market.76  One such effort, 
reflected in the Mead Article, is to reduce public financial support for 
voucher programs.77  Of course, those children lucky enough to be 
born into wealthy families are all but immune from such reductions 
and retain the ability to exit private for public schools. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Mead’s Article casts helpful and important light on the 
unexpected recent growth in publicly funded voucher programs.  
Given the political opposition such programs reflexively stimulate, 
the recent surge in legislative support warrants note.  That such 
programs appear to be gaining political popularity illustrates not only 
the ever-shifting politics surrounding education policy, but also the 
public’s growing frustration with the inability of too many public 
schools to generate and deliver adequate education services. 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Arguments, such as the one advanced by Professor Mead, that seek to 
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Efforts to enlist the growing popularity of publicly funded voucher 
programs into the service of arguments to reduce public support for 
voucher programs, such as Mead’s, strike me as unpersuasive.  The 
core of Mead’s Article reflects an unduly narrow conception of the 
relation between voucher programs and educational adequacy, to say 
nothing of aspirations for greater equal educational opportunity.  
Mead’s argument also privileges the parochial self-interests of public 
schools and public school teachers over the interests of children and 
families seeking greater education options.  Finally, to the extent that 
efforts to reduce available education options reflects growing 
concerns about adverse selection’s consequences for public schools, 
Mead’s argument falls short.  Unlike in the health insurance context, 
where federal law can compel citizen participation in health insurance 
markets, no such similar legal instrument exists in the education 
context.  While Mead’s argument indirectly seeks to reduce flight 
from failing public schools, it cannot eliminate flight from public 
schools by those families fortunate enough to have the ability to 
exercise school choice without a public subsidy. 
Years ago I wrote that while social science remains unable to 
explain why too many schoolchildren do not achieve desired 
academic performance levels, the failures themselves are hauntingly 
easy to predict.78  Sadly—even tragically—what Professor Howard 
Gardner observed in 2000 remains in full force today: “Tell me the 
ZIP code of a child and I will predict her chances of college 
completion and probable income; add the elements of family support 
(parental, grandparental, ethnic and religious values) and a few 
degrees of freedom remain, at least in our country.”79 
That Professor Gardner’s alarming observation exists—let alone 
persists—should trouble anyone who seeks to plausibly harbor a 
belief in America’s ideal of equal educational opportunity.  To the 
extent that equal educational opportunity means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that ZIP codes should not predict a child’s 
educational destiny.  As such, education policy makers should seek 
policies that contribute to and expand, rather than impede or limit, 
avenues toward greater equality of educational opportunity. 
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